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Case of The Day-
March  01, 2004-March  05, 2004

Case of The Day Archives

March 1, 2004

-Casa Herrera v. Beydoun 2/2/04 SC S111998 “a resolution . . . based on the parol evidence rule cannot be a favorable termination" on which to base a malicious prosecution action-
Judgment on the pleadings sustained.  Its not a "favorable termination on the merits." 02/02/04
 

March 2, 2004

Tort- Bank customer subjected to ordeal -pat down etc. on erroneous report that check was no good.----Issue: whether tort liability may be imposed for statements made when a citizen contacts law enforcement personnel to report suspected criminal activity on the part of another person. [S]uch statements are privileged pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) (section 47(b)),[1] and can be the basis for tort liability only if the plaintiff can establish the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution. Hagberg v. Calif. Fed. Bank Jan 05 2004S105909

March 3, 2004

Criminal: Galland pleaded guilty to drug charges after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based on information furnished by a confidential informant.  At request of police, magistrate sealed the affidavit supporting the warrant in order to protect the informant’s identity.  When Galland moved to discover the sealed materials, traverse and quash the warrant, and suppress the evidence . . . the trial court proceeded to rule on (and deny) these defense motions without first conducting an in camera review of the sealed materials.  Court’s refusal to conduct the in camera review was a clear abuse of discretion under People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948 (Hobbs).  Court  reverses order denying defense motions, and conditionally reverse the judgment to allow the court to conduct in camera proceedings in accordance with Hobbs guidelines.  P. v. Galland 2/4/03 CA4/3 Mar 03 2004G031342

March 4, 2004

Plaintiff, an attorney, alleged that defendants falsely told others he was “doing cocaine,” thus accusing him of a crime and injuring him in his profession.  (See Civ. Code, § 46.)  Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statement was privileged under Civil Code section 47, (b) and (c), because defendants had made the statement to business associates with whom they shared a common interest in plaintiff’s ability to provide competent legal representation in an official proceeding before a local planning commission.  The superior court granted defendants’ motion on these grounds and also because plaintiff filed no opposition.    After the superior court granted summary judgment, defendants moved for attorneys’ fees under CCP section 1021.7. Court: After interpreting statute the supreme court reversed the appellate court award of attorney fees. Under CCP 1021.7 only police officer can recover attorney fees. [Informative discussion re interpretation of statute.] Martin v. Szeto No. S103417February 19, 2004--*

 March 5, 2004

A group of homeowners—plaintiffs in the underlying action and claimants in the proceedings from which this appeal was taken (claimants)—sued the developer of their subdivision for various alleged defects in their homes. Rampart could not participate in the trial because it owed franchise taxes. Rampart claimed, notwithstanding it filed an answer but did not participate in the trial -judgment against it was by default and could not exceed demand in complaint--Court: Judgment against Rampart was not entered by “default.”[3]  As long as Rampart’s answer remained on file, the court lacked the authority to enter its default.  Rampart’s failure to appear for trial after having received proper notice of the trial date authorized the entry of judgment against it under Code of Civil Procedure section 594, following an “uncontested” evidentiary hearing, but it did not authorize the entry of a default judgment.  (Merrifield v. Edmonds (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 336, 341; see Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 862-864.)  We therefore reject the claims administrator’s contention that Code of Civil Procedure section 580 limited the judgment that the trial court could validly enter against Rampart to $125,000. But judgment for personal injuries void because not claimed in the complaint*** Very good discussion re statement of damages, purpose and due process   Garamendi v. Golden Eagle 3/4/04 CA1/3A097435A

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