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Table of Forms |
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Vcielaw.com |
Law Student Section |
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05-14-01 to 05-16-01
05-17-01 to 05-17-01
05-18-01 to 05-18-01
05-21-01 to 05-21-01
05-25-01 to 05-25-01
05-29-01 to 05-29-01
05-30-01 to 05-30-01
05-31-01 to 05-31-01
California Case Summaries
Slip Opinions May 2001
05-30-01 to 05-30-01
| May 30 2001 |
JAD2-01.PDF |
P. v. Foster 4/3/01 Los Angeles/AD
The instant appeal involves the common scenario of a failure to appear by a person cited for a traffic violation. As a result of the failure to appear, a warrant is issued pursuant to Vehicle Code section 40515[1], and a new charge of failure to appear, in violation of Vehicle Code section 40508, subdivision (a)[2], is appended to the underlying traffic charge. (See People v. Superior Court (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 283, 285.) In this case we hold that because Vehicle Code section 40508, subdivision (a), is a misdemeanor and not an infraction, the traffic defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the failure to appear charge, and the failure to advise the defendant of the right to a jury trial and obtain a waiver thereof constitutes reversible error. |
| May 30 2001 |
JAD2-01.DOC |
P. v. Foster 4/3/01 Los Angeles/AD
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov |
| May 30 2001 |
E027632.PDF |
M.G. v. Time-Warner 5/30/01 CA4/2
In September 1999, Sports Illustrated and an HBO television program, Real Sports, used the 1997 team photograph of a Little League team to illustrate stories about adult coaches who sexually molest youths playing team sports. Plaintiffs, all of whom appear in the photograph, were formerly players or coaches on the Little League team. The team’s manager, Norman Watson, pleaded guilty to molesting five children he had coached in Little League. Plaintiffs have sued defendants and appellants, hereafter referred to as “Time Warner” or the media defendants, for invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress. Time Warner brought a motion to strike plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the so-called anti-SLAPP statute. SLAPP is the acronym for “strategic lawsuits against public participation.”[1] The trial court denied the SLAPP motion, ruling that plaintiffs had a reasonable probability of succeeding on their claims, particularly that for public disclosure of a private fact. Time Warner now appeals. We affirm, holding that plaintiffs have demonstrated a prima facie case for invasion of privacy. |
| May 30 2001 |
E027632.DOC |
M.G. v. Time-Warner 5/30/01 CA4/2
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov |
| May 30 2001 |
B131509M.PDF |
Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty 5/30/01 CA2/3
Modification of Order 4. The paragraph commencing at the bottom of page 19 and continuing to the top of page 20 is modified as follows: Based on Grier’s work on the Sea Mar International case and the Bradford Personnel v. Trammel Crow case, Michael tried to characterize Grier’s involvement in the Michael case as an “ongoing employment relationship” with Aetna. Michael admitted, however, that the Sea Mar International matter ended in January 1996. Grier’s work on the Bradford Personnel v. Trammell Crow case ended in July 1997. We have reviewed the record and conclude that Grier did not perform substantial work on the Michael v. Aetna matter before Grier contacted Michael’s appraiser, Mr. Fox, on August 1, 1997. Moreover, as we conclude, infra, it is undisputed that while he worked on the Bradford Personnel matter, Grier did not know of Aetna’s presence in the Bradford Personnel case or that Aetna was the source of the funds used to pay him for his services. Therefore a person aware of the facts would not reasonably entertain a doubt that Grier would be able to be impartial, and Grier was not required to disclose the Sea Mar International or Bradford Personnel v. Trammell Crow cases. 5. Footnote 6 on page 19 is deleted. There is no change in the judgment Appellants’ petition for rehearing is denied. |
| May 30 2001 |
B131509M.DOC |
Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty 5/30/01 CA2/3 |
| May 30 2001 |
B135141.PDF |
Jie v. Liang Tie Knitwear 5/30/01 CA2/3
Liang Tai Knitwear Co., Ltd.
(Manufacturer) and Hong Yuan Industrial Co., Ltd. (Marketer) (collectively
defendants) are in the garment business here in Los Angeles. Lou Yu Jie (Wife)
and Fu E. Min (Husband) (collectively plaintiffs) both worked for defendants in
the garment business. After defendants laid-off plaintiffs, plaintiffs sued,
alleging their terminations were retaliatory in nature; plaintiffs had reported
defendants to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the INS had
raided defendants’ business and arrested approximately 40 percent of defendants’
labor force as undocumented, and hence illegal, workers. The jury found in
favor of plaintiffs, and defendants now appeal. We affirm. http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov |
| May 30 2001 |
B135141.DOC |
Jie v. Liang Tie Knitwear 5/30/01 CA2/3 |
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| May 30 2001 |
A088522.PDF |
Smith v. SHN Consulting 5/23/01 CA1/3 Which statute of limitations applies to a general contractor’s claims against an architect and construction manager for economic losses sustained due to their alleged professional negligence during construction? Instead of the two-year statute governing claims for breach of an oral contract (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, subd. (1)), the general contractor in this case urges us to apply the four-year statute of limitations for patent deficiencies in construction (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.1). We conclude that Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1 does not encompass such claims, and affirm the summary judgment entered in the trial court. |
| May 30 2001 |
A088522.DOC |
Smith v. SHN Consulting 5/23/01 CA1/3 |
| May 30 2001 |
B137620.PDF |
Ames v. Paley 5/30/01 CA2/3 Defendant and appellant Stephen Paley (Paley) appeals a postjudgment order in favor of plaintiffs and respondents Martha Rose Ames, Rose J. Schurter, as trustee of the Rose J. Schurter Revocable Trust, and Rojo Corporation (hereafter, plaintiffs), modifying the judgment so as to make interest thereon retroactive. The essential issue presented is whether the trial court had the inherent power to modify the judgment to correct an omitted term pertaining to the date Paley’s promissory note obligation would commence. In granting the earlier motion for entry of judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, [1] the trial court intended to enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement. Accordingly, to the extent the judgment failed to conform to the terms of the settlement agreement, the trial court retained the inherent power to correct the judgment at any time nunc pro tunc. Therefore, the postjudgment modification order is affirmed. |
| May 30 2001 |
B137620.DOC |
Ames v. Paley 5/30/01 CA2/3 |