Appellant Michelle Lynn Shoup appeals from Sacramento County action Nos. 98M09139 and 96F07655.

     It appears that action No. 98M09139 was at all times a prosecution for misdemeanor offenses only, which resulted in misdemeanor convictions by a jury.  Action No. 96F07655 was a proceeding to revoke probation in a felony case which was consolidated for hearing with action No. 98M09139.  At the conclusion of the misdemeanor trial/probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked probation based on its independent evaluation of the evidence. 

     This court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal in action No. 98M09139; an appeal in said action must be taken to the appellate division of the superior court.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; Pen. Code, § 1466.)  The appeal from action No. 98M09139 is hereby dismissed.

     The appeal from action No. 96F07655 remains properly pending in this court.  However, the parties, in their briefs, have raised issues and cited law that apply to trials and not necessarily to probation revocation proceedings.  All briefs of appellant and respondent are hereby stricken.

     Appellant shall file, within 30 days, a new opening brief that raises issues, if any, as are appropriate to the probation revocation proceeding.  Respondent shall file its brief within 30 days of the filing of appellant’s new opening brief. 

Appellant may thereafter file a reply brief within the time designated by the California Rules of Court.  (CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.)

FOR THE COURT:

Plaintiff Daniel R. Solin, an attorney, retained O'Melveny and Myers ("O'Melveny") to obtain advice regarding Solin's representation of Edith Reich and Brigitte R. Jossem (together referred to as the "Clients").  In that regard, Solin disclosed certain privileged and confidential information of the Clients (the "Secrets") which implicated them in criminal activities.

Solin sued O'Melveny for professional malpractice, alleging that O'Melveny failed to advise him of pertinent legal authority regarding one of the matters on which he retained the law firm.  The Clients intervened, seeking dismissal of the suit to avoid the disclosure of the Secrets.  The trial court determined that O'Melveny could not effectively defend the action without disclosing the confidences of the Clients, and dismissed the lawsuit.  We affirm the judgment of dismissal.

Government Code section 84305 [1] requires candidates for public office, and individuals or groups supporting or opposing a candidate or ballot measure, to identify themselves on any mass mailings they send to prospective voters.  In Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 851, 855 (Griset I), this court unanimously upheld the statute’s validity as to candidates and candidate-controlled committees.  Because that holding resolved the case before us, we, unlike the Court of Appeal, did not address the broader question of the constitutional validity of section 84305 with respect to persons and entities other than candidates and candidate-controlled committees.
After our decision in Griset I became final and after the United States Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari, plaintiffs, in the same action, again asked the superior court to declare section 84305 unconstitutional.  Plaintiffs relied on a decision by the United States Supreme Court, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n (1995) 514 U.S. 334, which held unconstitutional the imposition of a fine on an individual who had distributed anonymous leaflets opposing a proposed school tax levy.  That decision was filed after Griset I, but before the high court’s denial of plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari in Griset I. 
The superior court denied plaintiffs’ request and entered judgment for defendant Fair Political Practices Commission.  On plaintiffs’ appeal from that judgment, the Court of Appeal reversed.

The threshold issue in the matter now before us (Griset II, which arises from the same action as Griset I) is whether the Court of Appeal had the authority to entertain plaintiffs’ second appeal in the same action, to again consider the constitutionality of section 84305 after our decision in Griset I had become final.  We conclude the Court of Appeal lacked such authority.

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Pursuant to a warrant issued by respondent superior court, law enforcement authorities seized numerous documents from real parties in interest Gary Laff and Jerry Widawski, who are attorneys suspected of criminal conduct.  Real parties in interest (hereafter the attorneys) requested that the superior court conduct an in camera hearing to determine whether any of the seized documents were privileged.  The court sealed the documents and refused to proceed with the hearing unless the People, represented by the district attorney’s office, agreed to pay one-half the cost of the services of a special master appointed by the superior court to review the documents.  The Court of Appeal denied the People’s petition for writ of mandate, which sought to compel the superior court to conduct the hearing without requiring the People to contribute to the cost of a special master.  The appellate court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 639, subdivision (a)(4),[1] which permits a compulsory reference when necessary for the information of the court in a special proceeding, authorizes the appointment of a referee to assist in ruling upon the claims of privilege asserted by the attorneys.  The Court of Appeal further determined that the cost of the referee may be apportioned among the parties pursuant to section 645.1, subdivision (b).[2]

We granted review to decide whether the superior court properly refused to proceed with the hearing unless the People agreed to the appointment of a special master compensated in part by the People.  In addition, we subsequently obtained supplemental briefing from the parties regarding the threshold issue whether a superior court is authorized to conduct such a hearing.