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California
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05-14-01 to 05-16-01
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05-18-01 to 05-18-01
05-22-01 to 05-22-01
California Case Summaries
Slip Opinions May 2001
05-21-01 to 05-21-01
| May 21 2001 |
H020625.PDF
H020625.DOC |
Wershba v. Apple Computer 5/21/01 CA6
In the fall of 1997, Apple was experiencing financial difficulties. As part of its effort to cut costs, Apple decided to restructure its technical support policies. On October 13, 1997, Apple issued a press release announcing that it would discontinue its prior practice of providing free telephone technical support to purchasers of certain Apple products. The free support “for as long as you own your Apple product” had been promised in brochures advertising and accompanying the products. Technical support would henceforth be available through other means, including a telephonic voice response system and internet-based support. Customers who wished to continue to obtain live telephone technical support could do so for a fee of $35 per incident, or could purchase a multi-incident support contract for $69. The change in policy was to be “effective immediately.” By letter dated November 7, 1997, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) notified Apple that it was initiating an investigation into Apple’s change of policy regarding technical support. On November 24,
1997, the first of three class action lawsuits against Apple was filed in
Orange County. (Consumer Advocates and Prado v. Apple Computer, Inc.,
(Super. Ct. Orange County, 1997, No. 787214), hereafter referred to as the
Prado action.) The complaint alleged that the class consisted of
Apple customers who had purchased a covered product and were affected by the
withdrawal of free technical support. The complaint alleged further that
Apple’s change in its technical support policy breached its contracts with its
customers and violated the California Business and Professions Code (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.) and the California Consumers Legal Remedies
Act. (Civ. Code, § 1750, et seq.) The complaint sought injunctive relief,
restitution, damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Discovery
commenced in the Prado action and continued during 1998. |
| May 21 2001 |
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| May 21 2001 |
B144333.PDF |
TrafficSchoolOnline v. Super. Ct. 5/21/01 CA2/5
Plaintiff, TrafficSchoolOnline, Inc., (plaintiff) has filed a mandate petition seeking to set aside the respondent court’s order of August 18, 2000, transferring the present matter to this court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396. Plaintiff contends that the respondent court had no authority to transfer a case to the Court of Appeal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396. We conclude first that the respondent court could not, in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 396, transfer this case from itself to the California Court of Appeal. In this regard, we concude that the superior court is not vested with the authority by Code of Civil Procedure section 396 to transfer a case to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court. Further, we conclude that respondent court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of plaintiff’s claims concerning a proposed home study traffic school program. Accordingly, we issue our peremptory writ of mandate. http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov |
| May 21 2001 |
B144333.DOC |
TrafficSchoolOnline v. Super. Ct. 5/21/01 CA2/5 |
| May 21 2001 |
A091298.PDF |
Gilliland v. Medical Board 5/21/01 CA1/2
Doctor Jack L. Gilliland (Gilliland) and Jose Rivera (Rivera) appeal from the denial of their petition for writ of administrative mandamus. Ron Joseph (Joseph), the Executive Director of the Medical Board of California and Acting Director of the Department of Consumer Affairs, charged Gilliland and Rivera with violating Business and Professions Code section 805[1] because they filed a late report of another doctor’s suspension/termination. The question before us is whether the Division of Medical Quality, Medical Board of California, Department of Consumer Affairs, State of California (Board) has jurisdiction and authority to assess and impose a civil penalty pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA; Gov. Code, § 11400 et seq.). The trial court ruled that it did, but we disagree. We hold that the statute specifies that the action must be brought by the Attorney General (§ 805, subd. (h)), and since the Attorney General is only a party in an action in court, the Board did not have jurisdiction to impose a penalty under this statute in an administrative proceeding. |
| May 21 2001 |
A091298.DOC |
Gilliland v. Medical Board 5/21/01 CA1/2
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| May 21 2001 |
H018775.PDF |
Smith v. Rae-Venter 5/21/01 CA6
This appeal arises out of a dispute between Timothy Smith (“Smith”) and his former employer, the Rae-Venter Law Group (“RVLG”). Following his resignation from RVLG, Smith presented disputed wage claims to the California Labor Commission. At an administrative hearing on those claims, Smith achieved partial success: he secured an award that included vacation pay and expense reimbursements but his claims for a bonus and for statutory waiting time penalties were rejected. Dissatisfied with the labor commissioner’s decision, Smith appealed to the superior court, which conducted a trial de novo. At the conclusion of that trial, the court granted Smith the same relief awarded him by the labor commissioner except that it added interest on his non-wage claims. Based on its determination that Smith had succeeded in his appeal from the labor commissioner’s decision, the trial court denied RVLG the statutory attorneys’ fees and costs it sought. |
| May 21 2001 |
H018775.DOC |
Smith v. Rae-Venter 5/21/01 CA6 |
| May 21 2001 |
S079575.PDF |
P. v. Torres 5/21/01
SC In Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, we upheld the constitutionality of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq. (Act)).[1] The Act provides for civil commitment of criminal defendants who, after serving their prison terms, are found to be “sexually violent predator[s].” (§ 6604.) At issue here is whether this determination must be based upon a finding by the trier of fact at trial that the defendant’s prior sexual crimes involved “predatory acts,” which are statutorily defined as acts against a stranger, a casual acquaintance, or someone cultivated for the purpose of victimization. (§ 6600, subd. (e).) We conclude that the trier of fact need not make such a finding.[1] Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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| May 21 2001 |
S079575.DOC |
P. v. Torres 5/21/01 SC |
