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Table of Forms |
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Vcielaw.com |
Law Student Section |
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05-14-01 to 05-16-01
05-17-01 to 05-17-01
05-18-01 to 05-18-01
California Case Summaries
Slip Opinions May 2001
05-18-01 to 05-18-01
| May 18 2001 |
A085999.PDF |
Krantz v. BT Visual Images 5/18/01 CA1/4
These are three appeals from a final judgment and satellite orders entered by the San Francisco County Superior Court in a suit for damages for breach of contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, and defamation. We are asked by plaintiff-appellant to rule the sustention of a demurrer to the amended complaint without leave to amend was erroneous as a matter of law, the rulings granting defendants partial summary judgment/summary adjudication improperly shifted the burden of proof, and a series of discovery scrimmages were wrongly refereed by a court commissioner, preventing plaintiff from obtaining evidence necessary to overcome some 17 motions in limine on the eve of trial. Evaluated by the trial court under an erroneous standard, it is argued, these motions were granted, leading to a final judgment of nonsuit against plaintiff |
| May 18 2001 |
A085999.DOC |
Krantz v. BT Visual Images 5/18/01 CA1/4 |
| May 18 2001 |
B138713.PDF |
White v. Browne 5/18/01 CA2/5
Renewal of a judgment is a ministerial act performed by a court clerk upon receipt of an application for renewal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.120, subd. (b), 683.150, subd. (a)[1]; Beneficial Financial, Inc. v. Durkee (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 912, 915.) Section 683.150, subdivision (a) states: “Upon the filing of the application, the court clerk shall enter the renewal of the judgment in the court records.” Section 683.170 allows a judgment debtor to move to vacate the renewed judgment.[2] W. Stevenson Browne (defendant) appeals from an order denying his section 683.170 motion to vacate the renewal of a judgment. Defendant argues that because the parties accepted as a fact he was never served with the summons and complaint, the timely motion to vacate the renewal should have been granted. We agree. We direct the trial court, on remand, to enter an order granting defendant’s motion. [1] All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted. [2] Section 683.170 provides in its entirety: “(a) The renewal of a judgment pursuant to this article may be vacated on any ground that would be a defense to an action on the judgment, including the ground that the amount of the renewed judgment as entered pursuant to this article is incorrect, and shall be vacated if the application for renewal was filed within five years from the time the judgment was previously renewed under this article. [¶] (b) Not later than 30 days after service of the notice of renewal pursuant to Section 683.160, the judgment debtor may apply by noticed motion under this section for an order of the court vacating the renewal of the judgment. The notice of motion shall be served on the judgment creditor. Service shall be made personally or by mail. [¶] (c) Upon the hearing of the motion, the renewal may be ordered vacated upon any ground provided in subdivision (a), and another and different renewal may be entered, including, but not limited to, the renewal of the judgment in a different amount if the decision of the court is that the judgment creditor is entitled to renewal in a different amount.” |
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B138713.DOC |
White v. Browne 5/18/01 CA2/5 |
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B135854.PDF |
Tucci v. Club Mediterranee 5/18/01 CA2/3
After she was injured while at work in the Dominican Republic, plaintiff Gina Tucci brought a personal injury action in California against her employer, defendant Club Med.[1] Once the case was at issue, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. In her motion, Tucci relied on the provision in the California workers’ compensation law (Lab. Code, §§ 3200 et seq.)[2] allowing her to avoid the law’s exclusivity to sue for damages in tort. Tucci claimed she was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of her employer’s negligence. In its motion, Club Med acknowledged the jurisdiction of the California courts but contended that under applicable choice of law principles, the law of the Dominican Republic governed and precluded Tucci’s tort action against her employer. Ruling that the law of the Dominican Republic applied, the trial court granted Club Med summary judgment and denied Tucci’s motion. We conclude, pursuant to established choice of law principles, that the trial court was correct. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. |
| May 18 2001 |
B135854.PDF |
Tucci v. Club Mediterranee 5/18/01 CA2/3
After she was injured while at work in the Dominican Republic, plaintiff Gina Tucci brought a personal injury action in California against her employer, defendant Club Med.[1] Once the case was at issue, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. In her motion, Tucci relied on the provision in the California workers’ compensation law (Lab. Code, §§ 3200 et seq.)[2] allowing her to avoid the law’s exclusivity to sue for damages in tort. Tucci claimed she was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of her employer’s negligence. In its motion, Club Med acknowledged the jurisdiction of the California courts but contended that under applicable choice of law principles, the law of the Dominican Republic governed and precluded Tucci’s tort action against her employer. Ruling that the law of the Dominican Republic applied, the trial court granted Club Med summary judgment and denied Tucci’s motion. We conclude, pursuant to established choice of law principles, that the trial court was correct. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. |
| May 18 2001 |
B135854.DOC |
Tucci v. Club Mediterranee 5/18/01 CA2/3 |